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AVIATION LAW-LIABILITY UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION-SECOND CIRCUIT HOLDS
THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AN
OCCURRENCE AMOUNTS TO AN "ACCIDENT"
REQUIRES A SPECIFIC, FACTUAL INQUIRY:
MAGAN v. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES
BRIAN D'AmIco*

A

RTICLE 17 of the Warsaw Convention 1 provides for an air
carrier's liability to passengers who are injured by an "accident" while in flight.2 The Warsaw Convention, however, never
defines the word "accident."' In Air France v. Saks, the United
States Supreme Court defined "accident" to mean "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger."4 Although Saks gave meaning to the word "accident," "courts continued to struggle with its meaning in particular cases."'5 In the recent case of Magan v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, the Second Circuit ruled on the issue, holding that the
determination of whether a particular incidence of turbulence
6
amounts to an "accident" requires a case-by-case factual inquiry.
By overruling the district court's institution of a bright-line rule,
the Second Circuit's holding in Magan: 1) helps to provide international passengers with the means for fair recovery; 2) main* B.S., 2002, Florida Atlantic University; Candidate for J.D., 2005, Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. I would like to thank my wife
Becky, and my parents, Joseph and Faith D'Amico for encouraging me in all my
endeavors. Without their support, my future career in law would not be possible.
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. §40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2 See id. art. 17.

3 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
4 Id. at 405.
5 Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 162 (2nd Cir. 2003)
(Magan II).
6 See id. at 162.
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tains the apportionment of risk of liability for passenger injury
set forth by the Montreal Agreement; 7 and 3) furthers the Warsaw Convention's goal of harmonizing air laws across borders.
On March 27, 1999, John Magan was a passenger aboard Lufthansa German Airlines ("Lufthansa") Flight 5318 from Munich,
Germany to Sofia, Bulgaria.' The plane, a British Aerospace
Avro 146 regional jet, is a "high wing" aircraft with a fuel tank
extending over and into the passenger cabin from rows five
through eight.9 This reduces the ceiling height for those rows
to just six feet, three inches.' On this particular flight, Magan,
a tall man, had to crouch down on his way to his seat in row
seven. 11
During flight, Magan went to the lavatory next to the cockpit.12 While Magan was in the lavatory, the pilot made an announcement instructing passengers to return to their seats and
buckle-up in anticipation of turbulence. 13 Magan heeded the
warning and proceeded back to his seat as quickly as possible. 4
As he approached the fifth row-the row in which the fuel tank
starts to intrude into the passenger cabin-Magan violently
struck his head on the low ceiling, breaking his nose and dislodging a dental bridge from his mouth. 5 After the injury, he
was diagnosed as having severe and continuing "cluster
16
headaches.'

The circumstances surrounding the incident were sharply disputed. Magan claimed that as he returned from the lavatory,
the turbulence made it hard for him to stand.17 Indeed, he
maintained his balance by holding-on to the backs of seats. 18
Another passenger also noted that, at the time, the plane was
experiencing "very significant" turbulence. 9 On the other
hand, the pilot, who after observing heavy thunderstorms on the
7

CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed.Reg. 7302 (1966).

8 Magan II, 339 F.3d at 160.

9 Magan v. Lufthansa, 181 F. Supp. 2d 396, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd 339 F.3d
158 (2nd Cir. 2003) ("Magan I").
10 Id.

11See Magan II, 339 F.3d at 160.
12 Magan I, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
13 Magan II, 339 F.3d at 160.
14 Id.
15 See
16
17

id.

Id.
Id.

18 See id.
19 Id.
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radar made the in-flight announcement, later characterized the
turbulence as only light to medium in nature.2 °
Magan filed a claim against Lufthansa for his injuries under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 21 Lufthansa moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the turbulence experienced by
Flight 5318 did not amount to an "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention, and suggesting that the court defer to standards
developed by the FAA and the National Weather Service for
characterizing turbulence.22 These standards help pilots make
consistent radio communications regarding turbulence they encounter in flight. 23 Lufthansa reasoned that Flight 5318 encountered only "light" or "moderate" turbulence-as described
by the FAA standards-where it is hard for passengers to walk.2 4
So, the argument follows, even if Magan's injuries were caused
by turbulence, Lufthansa could not be held liable because such
25
turbulence is a normal and expected occurrence during flight.
The United States District Court of the Southern District of
New York agreed, holding broadly as a matter of law that injuries sustained in the course of "light" or "moderate" turbulence-as described by FAA turbulence reporting criteria-can
never qualify as resulting from an "accident" as defined by the
Supreme Court in Saks.2 6 The court was heavily swayed by the
Warsaw Convention's overarching goal of harmonizing the laws
that govern international travel. 27 The court reasoned that a
bright-line rule utilizing the FAA criteria would further this
goal. 28 Thus, the district court created a new test, where only
"severe" or "extreme" turbulence, as defined by the FAA, will
29
qualify as an accident.
The Second Circuit reversed. 0 In an opinion written by
Judge Oakes, the Second Circuit held that the district court had
no authority to create a new legal test for determining whether
an "accident" occurred.3 Moreover, Judge Oakes noted that
20 Id.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.

29
30
31

Id. at 402.
Magan II, 339 F.3d at 159.
Id. at 164.

See id. at 162.
See id. at 164.
Id. at 162.
Id.

Magan , 181 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
Id.
Id.
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the district court failed to account for the contradictory evidence regarding the degree of turbulence experienced by Flight
5318.32 Finding that an airline can indeed be held liable for
injuries sustained during turbulence, the Second Circuit relied
on the definition of "accident" articulated by the Supreme
Court in Saks. 33 The court restated the Saks formulation: "the
term 'accident' connotes an 'unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger,"' but "'when [an]
injury indisputably results from [a] passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident."'
Guided in its analysis by the principles announced in Saks,
nothing suggested to the court that a bright-line rule should be
established for determining whether a particular incidence of
turbulence amounted to an "accident."3 5 Instead, the court reasoned, "such a determination-the degree of prevalence, or
risk, of a particular weather event in any given circumstances,
and to what degree it might be 'beyond the normal and preferred mode of operation for the flight'-is a factual matter
more appropriately addressed at trial."3 6 The Second Circuit
also rejected the district court's adoption of the FAA turbulence
criteria, noting that
[A]lthough the degree of turbulence-as opposed to its mere
occurrence-may be relevant among other factors, to the question of whether an "accident" has occurred as a matter of fact,
the trial court's attempt to graft weather-reporting criteria for pilots onto the definition to create a new rule of law is misplaced.37
The court reasoned that under Saks, courts do not have the
authority to add requirements for proving that an "accident" has
occurred.3 8 Therefore, the district court was not empowered to
force Magan to prove that the turbulence he encountered was
"severe" or "extreme" as described by the FAA turbulence criteria. Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for factfinders to determine whether Magan's injuries were caused by an "accident."39 Thus, under Magan, a pas32

See id. at 166.

33 See id. at 161, 166.
34 Id. at 161-62 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-06).
35 Id. at 163.
36

Id. at 164.

37 Id. at 163.
38 Id.
31 Id. at 166.
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senger can recover for injuries sustained in the course of
turbulence so long as fact finders agree that the turbulence was
unexpected or unusual in terms of intensity or prevalence. This
is important for several reasons.
First, the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive remedy
for passenger injuries aboard international flights, preempting
all state and federal claims. 40 Therefore, it is imperative that the
Warsaw Convention provides international passengers with an
adequate means for recovery. The Second Circuit's formulation, which provides for a case-by-case inquiry into the facts surrounding injuries, is more in tune with this purpose of the
Warsaw Convention than the district court's formulation. With
its arbitrary line-drawing, the district court's rule denies recovery
whenever the injury-causing turbulence is not deemed strong
enough. And, as Magan demonstrates, even an occurrence violent enough to cause a broken and bloody nose may not qualify
as an "accident."'" Taken to its logical conclusion, the district
court's rule would provide no recovery even if Magan had died.
By foreclosing all opportunity for plaintiffs like Magan to recover, the district court's test frustrates the Warsaw Convention's
goal of recompensing injured passengers. Unlike the district
court, which would cut off plaintiffs as a matter of law, the Second Circuit's rule enables plaintiffs to prove, at trial, other circumstances that factfinders may find relevant to their
determination of whether an "accident" occurred.4 2 It is arguable that any less would not provide passengers with an adequate
means for recovery.
Second, the district court's rule frustrates the Warsaw Convention's carefully negotiated apportionment of air carrier liability.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit's holding maintains this
appointment and gives air carriers the appropriate incentives to
prevent future injuries. One of the Convention's central goals is
"to limit potential carrier liability for passenger injuries so as not
to frighten away potential investors from the fledgling air industry."' 4 3 Of course, this goal is balanced against the passenger's
right to recover for injuries sustained during travel. 44 A compromise was struck in the Montreal Agreement of 1966, where "air
carriers consented to a system under which they assumed 'virSee id. at 161. Magan II, 339 F.3d at 161.
See id. at 160.
42 Id. at 164.
43 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2000).
44 See id. at 296-97.
40
41
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tual strict liability' for death or injury to passengers" in ex45
change for a $75,000 cap on their liability.
Arguably, the district court's formulation of "accident" upsets
this balance, unduly reapportioning all risk of liability for injuries caused by minor turbulence to passengers. Without liability
for these types of injuries, airlines have no incentive to adopt
preventative measures. Such a result conflicts with
[O]ne of the guiding principles that pervades, and arguably explains, the original Convention, the subsequent modifications,
and even the Court's decision in Saks, [which] is an apportionment of risk to the party best able to control it... which encourages [air carriers] to take steps to minimize that risk to the
degree that it is within their control.4 6
With its case-by-case approach, the Second Circuit's rule
leaves the appropriate incentives in place. Faced with liability
for these types of injuries, air carriers will likely minimize their
exposure. Airlines may conduct turbulence studies, pressure
manufacturers to design safer aircraft, or adopt better safety
procedures. Of course, air carriers will adopt only those measures that cost less than the potential liability they help to avoid.
Nevertheless, some incentive is better than none. Thus, to the
amount possible, the Second Circuit's rule not only furthers a
passenger's right to recovery, but also facilitates the public's interest in making flight safer.
Finally, the Second Circuit's rule is also more in tune with the
Warsaw Convention's goal of harmonizing the laws that govern
international travel. By calling for a case-by-case approach to
the determination of what constitutes an "accident," Magan
brings the Second Circuit in line with relevant international
cases. In Quinn v. CanadianAirlines InternationalLtd.,4" for example, the Ontario Court General Division reviewed relevant
prior cases before noting that the case law "is authority for the
proposition that extreme turbulence can amount to [an] 'accident' under Article 17. It does not stand for the proposition
that some lesser but unusual or unexpected degree of turbulence could not be held to constitute an 'accident'.1 48 There,
just as the court in Magan instructed the district to proceed on
remand, so Judge Sutherland proceeded to inquire into the
Id. at 297.
Magan II, 339 F.3d at 162.
47 [1994]18 O.R.(3d) 326.
48 Id. at 333.
45
46
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facts surrounding the episode of turbulence before holding that
'49
it did not amount to an "accident.
Although the Second Circuit's final conclusion was correct,
the court misstated a portion of the Saks test for determining
whether an "accident" occurred. In its discussion of the issue,
the court noted that "[t]he Saks definition makes specific reference to the individual passenger's injuries as part of its inquiry."50 This seems to indicate that a finding of a serious or
specific type of injury can lead to a finding of an "accident." But
this is not what Saks stands for. Rather, the court in Saks stated
that "[t] his definition should be flexibly applied after [an] assessment of all the circumstances surroundinga passenger's injuries."5 1 Read carefully, this statement indicates that courts
should review the circumstances surrounding an injury-not including the injury itself-to determine whether an accident has
occurred. This interpretation of the Saks opinion finds support
in the text of the Warsaw Convention. The applicable section,
Article 17 of the Convention, provides:
The carrier shall be liablefor damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of
52
the operations of embarking or disembarking.
From the text of the Article 1 7, it is apparent that "accident"
and "damage" are two distinct and independent concepts. The
court in Saks picked up on this, noting that "American jurisprudence has long recognized this distinction between an accident
that is the cause of an injury and an injury that is itself an accident."5 3 By muddling the two, the Second Circuit's holding
could lead to interesting and unexpected results. Take, for example, an elderly man who falls and breaks his leg as his flight
encounters turbulence. To a court following Magan's instruction to inquire into the passenger's injury, the extent of the
man's injuries might suggest that the turbulence was indeed an
"accident." However, a court following Saks would only consider
the man's pre-injurious rather than his post-injurious condition
to determine whether an "accident" occurred. Instead of findSee id. at 334.
50 Magan II, 339 F.3d at 163.
51 Saks, 470 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
52 Warsaw Convention supra note 1 (emphasis added).
5
Saks, 470 U.S. at 399.
49
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ing an "accident," the court could find that the elderly man was
more prone to fall, and his bones more apt to break, during an
unfortunate encounter with normal and expected turbulence.
As this example demonstrates, two courts could come to very
different conclusions about the same incident. By calling for an
inquiry into the injury, as well as the circumstances surrounding
the injury, the Magan court confuses the Saks test and reduces
the relative importance of other facts surrounding the injury.
Although this hiccup in the Magan court's reasoning has not yet
been tested, it could lead the district court, on remand, to find
that there was an "accident" when one may not have really
occurred.
Even had the court applied the Saks principles correctly, the
outcome would have been the same-a reversal of the lower
court's holding. Until the district court revisits the case, or another similar case arises, we cannot know what effects the court's
misinterpretation of Saks will have. Despite its shortcomings,
the court's holding is good for international travel. By giving
passengers a better opportunity to recover for their injuries,
Magan is not only consistent with the goals of the Warsaw Convention, but also encourages safer flight. Faced with the possibility of liability for turbulence-related injuries, airlines will take
the appropriate steps to reduce their own exposure to liability.
Additionally, by clarifying the Saks formulation, Magan should
help other courts grapple with the word "accident." At least in
the Second Circuit, courts must conduct an intensive inquiry
into case-specific facts before determining that an "accident" has
or has not occurred.

